I have two pence worth below, possibly with errors, but main thing is
thanks, this is a really interesting discussion!

First off, I agree with Rob's sentiment, and changing from tear gas to
any not-prohibitive item merely shows that formalism isn't the answer.

Also, our discourse on this doesn't appear to have moved very far in the
last 150 years! The primary locus in the mid nineteenth century was
whether there was purported authority for the touching, and outside that
the nature of the mental state in touching, with "hostility" used as a
proxy. But consent was not relevant, probably until around the 1880s,
with the first Clerk and Lindsell in 1889 opining that it was a better
form of reasoning. In the old forms of action, it seemed a confession
and avoidance could not be used for a trespass claim, hence Lord Denman
CJ’s dictum in Christopherson v Bare that “it is a manifest
contradiction in terms to say that the defendant assaulted the plaintiff
by his permission”. But in the modern world, I think it has to be the
case that the lack of consent, and lack of enforced social norms, are
elements the claimant would have to prove if there were doubt. Perhaps
we are now engaging more outside the proxy of hostility, but certainly
that was dealing with the majority of cases being litigated then, so our
method might not have changed much.

And it's interesting that this is one of the places where the Criminal
law has exactly the same ambiguity, with some authorities saying the
absence of consent must be part of the AR and so something the
prosecutor must prove, some saying the presence of the consent would be
a defence for the defendant to prove. In reality, in both criminal law
and tort law, as soon as the allegation is made the defendant would
respond with consent if it were relevant, and the evidential burden
would be met quickly, forcing the prosecutor/claimant to substantiate
the claim. So it all comes out in the wash. I think the absence of
consent and socitally enforced norms of contact is part of the claim,
not a defence.

But in the sexual offences, by statute the absence of consent, and the
defendant's lack of reasonable belief in consent are expressly part of
the criminal offence, so must be proven by the defendant. It is strange
in a number of ways already to have different formulations of consent in
the OAPA and SOA, but where some conduct might be charged under either,
the prosecutor should not get to decide how consent is handled. In tort
of course, we don't have relevant separate tort actions for sexual
conduct now, but again there should the consent be something the
defendant would have to prove? I still think not.

I am not sure that negligence better balances the relevant interests.
I'm also not sure that the direct/indirect distinction from the 18th to
the 19th century makes more sensethan the requirement of intention as a
marker of trespass, and I understood that direct/indirect basis has been
kept in Australia. I'd need to be persuaded on both points, and it'd be
interesting to talk about that.

By the by, the criminal law accepts that self defence might be available
against a person who is not the source of the danger: R v Hitchens
[2011] EWCA CRIM 1626, where force was used against a woman who was
about to let a likely attacker into the flat. On the facts, the defence
failed as too much force had been used to be reasonable. Criminal law
tends to be less relational, and focused on the rights D has to exercise
self-defence which might also cause harm to others. But here was a
specific situation where a choice was made, not just collateral harm
from defending against the aggressor. There are a few people who don't
agree with this position as a matter of theory or doctrine. One response
is to wonder about how direct or indirect the threat has to be. Can you,
in the classic action movie form, shoot the baddie holding a hostage,
but shoot through the shoulder of the goodie and not be liable to the
goodie? Can you stop the goodie opening the door to great danger by
harming the goodie, whether the goodie knows what's on the other side or
not? I am content with yes, at the moment, but it is difficult to
consider whether you should compensate in any case. In the door
situation, might the goodie have been liable to you had the door been
opened and harm befallen you?


On 05/06/2020 19:14, Frederick Wilmot-Smith wrote:
> You seem to package the of self-defence into the cause of action. But
> there’s an initial question of whether absence of justification is a
> constituent of battery (as Robert Goff LJ may have thought in /Collins
> v Wilcock/) or whether battery just is the intentional application of
> force to another (as Diplock thought in /Letang v Cooper/).
>
> If you’re with Diplock, as in all things you should be, you’ll think
> the question is (prescinding from Donal/ Christine’s point for the
> moment: as Christine says, battery was conceded in this case) whether
> you have a defence. My only point is conceptual, that self-defence is,
> of its nature, against an aggressor. Do you disagree with that? (It
> doesn’t prejudge whether those who would tear-gas the bystanders have
> a privilege to do so; it simply means they can’t rely on self-defence
> to gas the bystanders.)
>
>
>> On 5 Jun 2020, at 18:52, Andrew Tettenborn
>> <a.m.tettenborn@swansea.ac.uk <mailto:a.m.tettenborn@swansea.ac.uk>>
>> wrote:
>>
>> But isn't this a bit question-begging? I may well have a right not to
>> be intentionally harmed by you (for example, if the only way you can
>> get at Rob to stop him laying into you is by pushing me over). But do
>> I have a right not to be collaterally damaged as a necessary result
>> of your self-defence -- for example, if Rob is levelling a rifle at
>> you and you push it aside knowing that it will injure me standing
>> next to him? I'm not sure.
>>
>> Andrew
>>
>>
>> On 05/06/20 18:03, Frederick Wilmot-Smith wrote:
>>> I basically agree with Rob (especially as regards the, ahem,
>>> unconventional qualified privilege approach in US law). But I think
>>> that I disagree with Andrew, and my (untutored) sense is that
>>> whether there’s anything to Gageler’s view depends on the nature of
>>> the privilege the would-be wrongdoer invokes.
>>>
>>> A privilege to commit a wrong has to be justified vis-a-vis all
>>> individuals against whom you want to invoke it. If Rob is about to
>>> shoot me, I might have a privilege to use force necessary to dispel
>>> the attack in self defence. But it’s in the nature of that privilege
>>> that it’s against the prospective source of harm. So I can only use
>>> it against /Rob./ Thus if Andrew is standing beside Rob, minding his
>>> own business, I cannot (/pace/Andrew) justify wronging /Andrew/ in
>>> self-defence (even if that is the only way to kill Rob and save
>>> myself). Put another (more counterintuitive) way, Andrew poses no
>>> threat to me, despite the fact that his presence might be part of a
>>> causal story leading to my death (but for Andrew, I survive—because
>>> I kill Rob).
>>>
>>> Necessity is, in theory, different. (Small wonder Gageler found
>>> those cases more useful.) There’s no conceptual requirement that the
>>> no-right bearer is the source of the risk I seek to avoid. So if Rob
>>> and Andrew are beside a tear gas canister Rob has dropped, and the
>>> only way I can avoid being gassed is by injuring/both/ Rob and
>>> Andrew, I may (depending on the law) have a necessity defence
>>> vis-a-vis Andrew.
>>>
>>>
>>>> On 5 Jun 2020, at 17:43, Robert Stevens
>>>> <robert.stevens@law.ox.ac.uk <mailto:robert.stevens@law.ox.ac.uk>>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> I don't see much balancing as necessary here. The use of tear gas
>>>> is unlawful. I can't use it to control disruptive children, and so
>>>> on its face nor can prison officers. Unless the state authority has
>>>> a special statutory privilege to gas these individuals, not
>>>> possessed by persons generally, this should be a tort everywhere.
>>>> Or at least it damn well should be, see a recent high profile
>>>> example in the news. The only question should be the interpretation
>>>> of the statute.
>>>>
>>>> (A statute permitting the use of tear gas against disruptive
>>>> children would be a disgrace. A statute permitting innocent
>>>> children to be gassed as collateral damage nearly unbelievable.)
>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> *From:*Christine Beuermann <Christine.Beuermann@newcastle.ac.uk
>>>> <mailto:Christine.Beuermann@newcastle.ac.uk>>
>>>> *Sent:*05 June 2020 17:19
>>>> *To:*Barry Allan <barry.allan@otago.ac.nz
>>>> <mailto:barry.allan@otago.ac.nz>>; Neil Foster
>>>> <neil.foster@newcastle.edu.au <mailto:neil.foster@newcastle.edu.au>>
>>>> *Cc:*obligations@uwo.ca
>>>> <mailto:obligations@uwo.ca><obligations@uwo.ca
>>>> <mailto:obligations@uwo.ca>>
>>>> *Subject:*Re: HCA on battery and use of force with passing comments
>>>> on bystanders
>>>> Leaving aside the statutory interpretation issues, I wonder if this
>>>> case was brought in England if it would be brought as a negligence
>>>> rather than a battery case? It should be remembered that the
>>>> Australian position on negligent trespass differs (or last time I
>>>> looked, anyway). As perhaps does the approach to determining what
>>>> was 'intentional'.
>>>> /
>>>> /
>>>> /Robinson/ comes to mind in this respect. As does /RvDeputy
>>>> Governor of Parkhurst Prison; Ex parte HagueandWeldonvHome
>>>> Office//(in which you might recall a gassed cell was actually
>>>> mentioned) /and the mistreatment of prisoner cases more generally
>>>> . The benefit of a negligence analysis is that the court is able
>>>> to balance the various interests at play (and scrutinise more
>>>> carefully what Gageler called the 'choice between two evils'). The
>>>> defence of necessity seems a rather blunt tool in the circumstances.
>>>>
>>>> Cheers
>>>>
>>>> Christine
>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> *From:*Barry Allan <barry.allan@otago.ac.nz
>>>> <mailto:barry.allan@otago.ac.nz>>
>>>> *Sent:*04 June 2020 06:44
>>>> *To:*Neil Foster <neil.foster@newcastle.edu.au
>>>> <mailto:neil.foster@newcastle.edu.au>>
>>>> *Cc:*obligations@uwo.ca
>>>> <mailto:obligations@uwo.ca><obligations@uwo.ca
>>>> <mailto:obligations@uwo.ca>>
>>>> *Subject:*Re: HCA on battery and use of force with passing comments
>>>> on bystanders
>>>> ⚠ External sender. Take care when opening links or attachments. Do
>>>> not provide your login details.
>>>> The mention of necessity triggered something in my mind. There was
>>>> a case where a building caught fire after the police chucked in a
>>>> gas canister to flush out a psychopath. This incidental infliction
>>>> of property damage was caught by a defence of necessity. /Austin v
>>>> Police/is probably more on point: to quell a riot, the Police
>>>> detained thousands in Oxford Circus for hours ("kettling" them),
>>>> including a large number of innocent passersby. The defence of
>>>> necessity was held to be available to justify what would otherwise
>>>> be false imprisonment. It does not seem to be a great stretch to
>>>> find this defence available for any of the trespass based torts -
>>>> if, indeed, the actions met the test of being necessary.
>>>>
>>>> Barry
>>>>
>>>> University of Otago
>>>> <https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.otago.ac.nz%2F&data=02%7C01%7CA.M.Tettenborn%40Swansea.ac.uk%7Cff2cb22d0f1f4c75a38b08d809728874%7Cbbcab52e9fbe43d6a2f39f66c43df268%7C0%7C1%7C637269734811734610&sdata=npz6fDS0Ajf%2B%2BKZOSFDFChQYT1VYC%2BJYH5Cm2b%2FCxYM%3D&reserved=0>
>>>> Barry Allan| BA, BCOM, LLM
>>>> Associate Professor
>>>> Faculty of Law| Te Kaupeka Tātai ture
>>>> University of Otago| Te Whare Wānanga o Otāgo
>>>>
>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> *From:*Neil Foster <neil.foster@newcastle.edu.au
>>>> <mailto:neil.foster@newcastle.edu.au>>
>>>> *Sent:*Wednesday, 3 June 2020 7:18 p.m.
>>>> *To:*Tettenborn A.M.
>>>> *Cc:*obligations@uwo.ca <mailto:obligations@uwo.ca>
>>>> *Subject:*Re: HCA on battery and use of force with passing comments
>>>> on bystanders
>>>> Thanks Andrew. One of the interesting features of Gageler J’s
>>>> comments is that I think he suggests that you could use force in
>>>> self-defence even if it caused harm to bystanders (ie that you
>>>> would have a “right” to use force) but that if the harm occurred
>>>> you would be obliged to compensate the bystanders! I seem to
>>>> remember we have had discussions previously on the ODG
>>>> about/Vincent v Lake Erie/raising similar issues.
>>>> See [47]:
>>>>
>>>> In working my way to that result, I have benefited from recent
>>>> academic writing exploring the general topic of "necessity" as a
>>>> defence to an action in tort in the United Kingdom*42*and the
>>>> United States*43*. Although I have found them to have no direct
>>>> utility, I have also considered the concepts of "incomplete
>>>> privilege"*44*and "conditional fault"*45*developed in academic and
>>>> professional writing in the United States by reference to/Vincent v
>>>> Lake Erie Transportation Co/*46*.
>>>>
>>>> But the comments have most plausibility if applied to police and
>>>> other public officials for whose actions the Crown will be held
>>>> liable; they seem unfair if applied to individuals. So I am not
>>>> sure that this sort of rule could be generalised across
>>>> tortfeasors. Much to chew over.
>>>>
>>>> Regards
>>>> Neil
>>>>
>>>> *NEIL FOSTER*
>>>> Associate Professor, Newcastle Law School
>>>> Faculty of Business and Law
>>>> 409 Hunter St
>>>> Newcastle
>>>>
>>>> T: +61 2 49217430
>>>> E: neil.foster@newcastle.edu.au
>>>> <mailto:Firstname.Lastname@newcastle.edu.au>
>>>>
>>>> Further details: http://www.newcastle.edu.au/profile/neil-foster
>>>> <https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.newcastle.edu.au%2Fprofile%2Fneil-foster&data=02%7C01%7CA.M.Tettenborn%40Swansea.ac.uk%7Cff2cb22d0f1f4c75a38b08d809728874%7Cbbcab52e9fbe43d6a2f39f66c43df268%7C0%7C1%7C637269734811734610&sdata=18wu5gH3IthKQnc%2Fqw9XH72rKvhoxtg5mCjFmWmro1k%3D&reserved=0>
>>>> My publications: http://works.bepress.com/neil_foster
>>>> <https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fworks.bepress.com%2Fneil_foster&data=02%7C01%7CA.M.Tettenborn%40Swansea.ac.uk%7Cff2cb22d0f1f4c75a38b08d809728874%7Cbbcab52e9fbe43d6a2f39f66c43df268%7C0%7C1%7C637269734812222467&sdata=3SBQG6ObgRC7he3MXUbkl4MXJCeMNH9uG3w8iZAI5y4%3D&reserved=0>/
>>>> , http://ssrn.com/author=504828
>>>> <https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fssrn.com%2Fauthor%3D504828&data=02%7C01%7CA.M.Tettenborn%40Swansea.ac.uk%7Cff2cb22d0f1f4c75a38b08d809728874%7Cbbcab52e9fbe43d6a2f39f66c43df268%7C0%7C1%7C637269734812222467&sdata=5WdhHWbDIofFV3Uge3aL2Gpco24Hh6ZHzxhzzHSp85g%3D&reserved=0>
>>>>
>>>> Blog: https://lawandreligionaustralia.blog
>>>> <https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flawandreligionaustralia.blog%2F&data=02%7C01%7CA.M.Tettenborn%40Swansea.ac.uk%7Cff2cb22d0f1f4c75a38b08d809728874%7Cbbcab52e9fbe43d6a2f39f66c43df268%7C0%7C1%7C637269734812232426&sdata=Bf5ZyqG4ZidRWkcaEiuy0UF0aYjoHnkOHNJGEjawv1I%3D&reserved=0>
>>>>
>>>> *The University of Newcastle (UoN)*
>>>> University Drive
>>>> Callaghan NSW 2308
>>>> Australia
>>>>
>>>> CRICOS Provider 00109J
>>>> <image001.png>
>>>>
>>>> *From:*"A.M.Tettenborn@swansea.ac.uk
>>>> <mailto:A.M.Tettenborn@swansea.ac.uk>"
>>>> <a.m.tettenborn@swansea.ac.uk <mailto:a.m.tettenborn@swansea.ac.uk>>
>>>> *Date:*Wednesday, 3 June 2020 at 4:01 pm
>>>> *To:*Neil Foster <neil.foster@newcastle.edu.au
>>>> <mailto:neil.foster@newcastle.edu.au>>
>>>> *Cc:*"obligations@uwo.ca <mailto:obligations@uwo.ca>"
>>>> <obligations@uwo.ca <mailto:obligations@uwo.ca>>
>>>> *Subject:*Re: ODG: HCA on battery and use of force with passing
>>>> comments on bystanders
>>>>
>>>> My first reaction is to be sceptical of Gageler J's interpretation.
>>>> I would be surprised if, say, police were unable to use force to
>>>> keep order merely because there were bystanders at risk. And
>>>> applying this reasoning to the defence of self-defence would be
>>>> grotesque: I would lose the right to defend myself against violence
>>>> by A if there were bystanders B C and D nearby who would be injured.
>>>>
>>>> I also doubt if this is a case of using bystanders instrumentally.
>>>> If the officer had incapacitated the other bystanders because they
>>>> obstructed his way to the youth they were subduing it might be. But
>>>> I'd see this injury as incidental rather than instrumental. Compare
>>>> the rules of necessity on property damage. I can't destroy your
>>>> property to prevent damage to mine. But I can take steps to divert
>>>> a flood from inundatng my land even though the effect is to cause
>>>> it to inundate yours.
>>>>
>>>> Andrew
>>>>
>>>> Sent fromBlueMail
>>>> <https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.bluemail.me%2Fr%3Fb%3D13187&data=02%7C01%7CA.M.Tettenborn%40Swansea.ac.uk%7Cff2cb22d0f1f4c75a38b08d809728874%7Cbbcab52e9fbe43d6a2f39f66c43df268%7C0%7C1%7C637269734812232426&sdata=JJkOHUcrTbKLBURxVw%2BPaMLXYiyA0fgIzueeFuyXG1Y%3D&reserved=0>
>>>> On 3 Jun 2020, at 03:05, Neil Foster <neil.foster@newcastle.edu.au
>>>> <mailto:neil.foster@newcastle.edu.au>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Dear Colleagues;
>>>> Very interesting tort decision today from the High Court of
>>>> Australia in/Binsaris v Northern Territory; Webster v Northern
>>>> Territory; O'Shea v Northern Territory; Austral v Northern
>>>> Territory/[2020] HCA 22 (3 June
>>>> 2020)http://www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/cth/HCA/2020/22.html
>>>> <https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww8.austlii.edu.au%2Fcgi-bin%2Fviewdoc%2Fau%2Fcases%2Fcth%2FHCA%2F2020%2F22.html&data=02%7C01%7CA.M.Tettenborn%40Swansea.ac.uk%7Cff2cb22d0f1f4c75a38b08d809728874%7Cbbcab52e9fbe43d6a2f39f66c43df268%7C0%7C1%7C637269734812242386&sdata=9CInUKU48RQ%2FVIOlcg1wvKg7kG1%2BJ%2FMRAZ7fmQcfw78%3D&reserved=0>.
>>>> The question is whether the tort of battery was committed when
>>>> prison officers used tear gas in controlling a disruptive
>>>> detainee in a youth detention centre; the allegations of
>>>> battery in this respect were brought, not by the disruptive
>>>> detainee themselves but by 4 other detainees who were located
>>>> nearby and were affected by the gas.
>>>> This was 5-member bench (Kiefel CJ and Keane J in one judgment;
>>>> Gordon and Edelman JJ in another; Gageler J wrote separately.)
>>>> A clear majority (the two “dual” judgments, if I can use that
>>>> term) found that the use of the CS gas was not justified
>>>> against either the main offender (and hence obviously not
>>>> against the “bystanders”) by the relevant legislation governing
>>>> use of such. While this as a “prohibited weapon” under NT law
>>>> was allowed to be used in “prisons” (for adults), it was not
>>>> authorised for use in “youth detention centres”. Hence the use
>>>> of gas was a battery (confirming the common sense view that
>>>> causing a substance to be propelled into someone’s body can be
>>>> just as much an interference with physical integrity as
>>>> actually hitting them with your hand.) There are some general
>>>> comments from Gordon and Edelman JJ that a power to do what is
>>>> “necessary” to enforce discipline is not sufficient statutory
>>>> authorisation on its own for the commission of a battery:
>>>>
>>>> [100] conferral of powers necessary or convenient to enable the
>>>> superintendent to perform their statutory functions does not
>>>> give the superintendent general authority to commit what would
>>>> otherwise be crimes or torts against detainees.
>>>>
>>>> However, Gageler J differed from the other members of the court
>>>> on the interpretation of the legislation. He took the view that
>>>> the Acts in question did authorise use of CS gas against the
>>>> main offender. But this meant that he had to consider the very
>>>> interesting question as to whether a defence in relation to one
>>>> person, authorised harm incidentally caused to bystanders. See
>>>> [38]:
>>>>
>>>> Mr Walker SC, who appears with Ms Foley and Mr McComish for the
>>>> other detainees, submits that the common law power of a police
>>>> officer to use such force as is reasonably necessary to
>>>> restrain or prevent a breach of the peace confers*no*common law
>>>> immunity from liability in battery to a bystander who is
>>>> injured through the application of that force. He submits that
>>>> police have no privilege to make "instrumental use" of a
>>>> bystander so as to cause "collateral damage" to the bystander
>>>> with impunity. Despite a surprising dearth of modern authority
>>>> on the topic,*I believe the submission to be correct*(emphasis
>>>> added)
>>>>
>>>> There is a very interesting review of the law on this area. For
>>>> example, his Honour notes that some of the older cases may have
>>>> been decided on the basis that police officers were personally
>>>> liable for wrongs and that the Crown could not be sued for the
>>>> torts of “constables”. He notes that due to a series of
>>>> statutory amendments around Australia, this is no longer the
>>>> case- that the Crown will usually be held vicariously liable.
>>>> And he concludes at [44]:
>>>>
>>>> legislative development, and the underlying legislative
>>>> acceptance of public responsibility for torts committed by
>>>> police officers, are appropriate to be factored into the
>>>> contemporary expression of the common law of Australia.
>>>>
>>>> In coming to the conclusion that the law should put
>>>> responsibility for “incidental” harm to bystanders on the
>>>> Crown, his Honour refers to what he says are analogous
>>>> principles in property cases and cites Virgo, "Justifying
>>>> Necessity as a Defence in Tort Law", in Dyson, Goudkamp and
>>>> Wilmot-Smith (eds), Defences in Tort (2015) 135, esp at 146-147
>>>> (at n 42).
>>>>
>>>> The conclusion at [49] even involves some comment on equity!
>>>>
>>>> Doctrinally, my preferred analysis is to focus on the scope of
>>>> the common law "privilege" or "immunity" attendant on the
>>>> common law "power", or "right" and "duty", of a police officer
>>>> to use force reasonably necessary to restrain or prevent a
>>>> breach of the peace. The attendant common law immunity is
>>>> unquestionably such as to provide a defence to a claim in
>>>> battery by the wrongdoer who is the target of the force.*The
>>>> attendant common law immunity, in my opinion, is not such as to
>>>> provide a defence to a claim in battery by a bystander who
>>>> suffers collateral harm by reason of the necessitous use of
>>>> force*. The bystander is entitled to damages at common law to
>>>> compensate for the harm for the simple reason that the use of
>>>> force has interfered with the bystander's bodily integrity.*The
>>>> interference is tortious in the absence of a defence*. The
>>>> tortious liability and concomitant entitlement to an award of
>>>> compensatory damages by a court administering the common law is
>>>> unaffected by the circumstance that*a court administering
>>>> equity*would decline to restrain the tortious but necessitous
>>>> use of force by pre-emptive injunction.
>>>>
>>>> Hence he agrees with the orders proposed by the majority,
>>>> because the statutory defences did not authorise the incidental
>>>> harm caused to the “bystanders”.
>>>>
>>>> His Honour’s judgement of course is not part of the/ratio/of
>>>> this case, and indeed there is a passing comment by Gordon and
>>>> Edelman JJ at [54] that the appeals can be resolved by
>>>> statutory interpretation and “do not turn on engaging or
>>>> applying any wider principle”. But they provide a very fruitful
>>>> basis for further discussion of this interesting question.
>>>>
>>>> It is also worthy of note that a decision of this sort has been
>>>> handed down on the day after a high profile incident in the USA
>>>> where it seems that tear gas may have been used on a crowd
>>>> outside the White House when it was not really needed to deal
>>>> with actual or threatened violence. But of course US law is
>>>> another matter altogether!
>>>>
>>>> Regards
>>>> Neil
>>>>
>>>> *NEIL FOSTER*
>>>> Associate Professor, Newcastle Law School
>>>> Faculty of Business and Law
>>>> 409 Hunter St
>>>> Newcastle
>>>>
>>>> T: +61 2 49217430
>>>> E: neil.foster@newcastle.edu.au
>>>> <mailto:Firstname.Lastname@newcastle.edu.au>
>>>>
>>>> Further details:
>>>> http://www.newcastle.edu.au/profile/neil-foster
>>>> <https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.newcastle.edu.au%2Fprofile%2Fneil-foster&data=02%7C01%7CA.M.Tettenborn%40Swansea.ac.uk%7Cff2cb22d0f1f4c75a38b08d809728874%7Cbbcab52e9fbe43d6a2f39f66c43df268%7C0%7C1%7C637269734812242386&sdata=D8VjFc2gay%2BHoa8CknFbp98GpKm%2BsDuHXZSMZXce%2Ffg%3D&reserved=0>
>>>> My publications: http://works.bepress.com/neil_foster
>>>> <https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fworks.bepress.com%2Fneil_foster&data=02%7C01%7CA.M.Tettenborn%40Swansea.ac.uk%7Cff2cb22d0f1f4c75a38b08d809728874%7Cbbcab52e9fbe43d6a2f39f66c43df268%7C0%7C1%7C637269734812252337&sdata=Nibf%2FQhro7aMk2tKAuGwCn%2Fyiq6J4L3s3US0eI%2F2fhk%3D&reserved=0>/
>>>> , http://ssrn.com/author=504828
>>>> <https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fssrn.com%2Fauthor%3D504828&data=02%7C01%7CA.M.Tettenborn%40Swansea.ac.uk%7Cff2cb22d0f1f4c75a38b08d809728874%7Cbbcab52e9fbe43d6a2f39f66c43df268%7C0%7C1%7C637269734812252337&sdata=aGQVuiC%2BmYODNa%2BNP2zs49xULg662eiyeGbh6FOiN38%3D&reserved=0>
>>>>
>>>> Blog: https://lawandreligionaustralia.blog
>>>> <https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flawandreligionaustralia.blog%2F&data=02%7C01%7CA.M.Tettenborn%40Swansea.ac.uk%7Cff2cb22d0f1f4c75a38b08d809728874%7Cbbcab52e9fbe43d6a2f39f66c43df268%7C0%7C1%7C637269734812262292&sdata=lbFKnbu%2Fo%2BwKtYaOxiaZ3mQZgSVRAcVwI1uSv8Dh%2Bl4%3D&reserved=0>
>>>>
>>>> *The University of Newcastle (UoN)*
>>>> University Drive
>>>> Callaghan NSW 2308
>>>> Australia
>>>>
>>>> CRICOS Provider 00109J
>>>> cid:image001.png@01D3A0F9.4CB70500
>>>>
>>>
>>
>> --
>> br>
>> --
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *Andrew Tettenborn*
>> /Professor of Commercial Law, Swansea University/
>>
>> Institute for International Shipping and Trade Law
>> School of Law, University of Swansea
>> Richard Price Building
>> Singleton Park
>> SWANSEA SA2 8PP
>> Phone 01792-602724 / (int) +44-1792-602724
>> Cellphone 07472-708527 / (int) +44-7472-708527
>> Fax 01792-295855 / (int) +44-1792-295855
>>
>>
>>
>> *Andrew Tettenborn*
>> /Athro yn y Gyfraith Fasnachol, Prifysgol Abertawe/
>>
>> Sefydliad y Gyfraith Llongau a Masnach Ryngwladol
>> Ysgol y Gyfraith, Prifysgol Abertawe
>> Adeilad Richard Price
>> Parc Singleton
>> ABERTAWE SA2 8PP
>> Ffôn 01792-602724 / (rhyngwladol) +44-1792-602724
>> Ffôn symudol 07472-708527 / (rhyngwladol) +44-7472-708527
>> Ffacs 01792-295855 / (rhyngwladol) +44-1792-295855
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ISTL <http://www.swansea.ac.uk/law/istl/>
>>
>> See us on Twitter:@swansea_dst <https://twitter.com/swansea_dst>
>> Read the IISTL Blog:iistl.wordpress.com <https://iistl.wordpress.com/>
>> My publications can be foundhere
>> <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8025-5630>andhere
>> <https://www.conservativewoman.co.uk/author/andrewtetterborn/>andhere<http://www.spiked-online.com/newsite/search_results/e33f8465aa58ebce86f46f4faed6a554/>
>> Member of theHeterodox Academy <https://heterodoxacademy.org/>and
>> member and adviser of theFree Speech Union <https://freespeechunion.org/>
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>
--
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Oxford
matthew.dyson@law.ox.ac.uk